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Over the past decade, Naval Special Warfare (NSW) has built up significant 
symbolic capital due to a string of highly politicized and romanticized military 
operations. The publicity, and the ensuing fame, helped set the conditions for the 
emergence of a SEAL counterculture characterized by an increasingly commodified and 
public persona. There has been a shift away from the traditional SEAL Ethos of quiet 
professionalism to a Market Ethos of commercialization and self-promotion, especially 
among former SEALs. At the same time, government officials, special interest groups, 
Hollywood, the publishing industry, and the media writ large have seen the profitability 
of associating their agendas with the SEAL identity. They are likewise tapping into 
SEAL fame and offering SEALs an outlet for the commodification of their SEAL 
affiliation. Such a promotional construct contravenes the dual requirements of security 
and surprise necessary for the success of SEAL missions. This paper analyzes these 
trends, and argues that the cultivation of celebrity status has incentivized narcissistic and 
profit-focused behavior within the SEAL community, which in turn has eroded 
organizational effectiveness, damaged national security, and undermined healthy civil-
military relations. To redress this, all parties must work to reestablish an environment that 
refrains from promoting special operations for entertainment value, for profit, or for 
political gain. 
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I. NAVY SEALS GONE WILD 
What would have happened if U.S. Navy SEALs had not killed Osama bin Laden, 
but rather he had been killed by a drone strike? Would President Obama’s administration 
have handled the publicity differently? Would the name and location of the drone 
operator’s unit have been released? Would the man or woman who pulled the trigger to 
release the missile have been lionized in mainstream American culture? Would Fox News 
have hired this drone operator to be a Fox News contributor, paid to comment on 
domestic and foreign policy? Would drone operators have materialized from the shadows 
to write tell-all books, star in movies, blog about sensitive drone operations, criticize the 
president, and run for political office on the platform that they were drone operators? 
(Hint: this is what many former SEALs are doing.) 
Such a scenario makes for an interesting counterfactual, because it may reveal 
something about how society views the functional role of special operations. For all 
intents and purposes, and from an “ends” perspective, there is no difference between a 
drone operator who pulls the trigger on his joystick and a Navy SEAL who pulls the 
trigger on his rifle. Both of these professionals have identical intentions—to kill. The 
only real difference is that the SEAL is in harm’s way, which he appreciates as a function 
of his profession and for which he is well compensated.1 Otherwise, both the drone 
operator and the SEAL work in teams. They both require security and surprise to do their 
jobs effectively. They both desire an information asymmetry vis-à-vis the enemy. They 
both kill with relative impunity. They both serve a role within the national security 
architecture in support of foreign policy objectives. They are both a weapons system.  
If we can agree that the only intrinsic difference is that the SEAL voluntarily goes 
into harm’s way, then it seems all the more critical that SEALs and their operations stay 
out of the press. Why would the government, society, and SEALs themselves want to 
romanticize and publicize the details of SEAL operations when this makes the SEALs’ 
                                                 
1 A drone strike would have been messier and would have resulted in some uncertainty about whether 
bin Laden had been killed or whether he had even been there for that matter. Using SEALs on the ground 
eliminated these uncertainties, but the ultimate policy objective could have been achieved either way.  
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job more difficult and future missions more dangerous? Yet, this is exactly what is now 
going on. Indeed, in the fourteen plus years since September 11, 2001, the U.S. Navy 
SEALs have received unprecedented publicity. They have likewise attained an 
extraordinary level of fame in mainstream American society. But, this has also turned 
them into casual and consistent media fodder for the masses. In essence, U.S. Navy 
SEALs have become celebrities, and the SEAL brand has been transformed into a 
lucrative and powerful currency in the marketplace of things and ideas. 
As indicated earlier, numerous former SEALs are now writing books, starring in 
movies, running for political office, blogging about special operations, and commenting 
on domestic and national security affairs. At the same time, government officials, private 
enterprises, special interest groups, Hollywood, the publishing industry, and the media 
writ large have seen the profitability in associating their products or agendas with the 
SEAL identity. They are thus also tapping into SEAL fame and offering SEALs an outlet 
for the commodification of their SEAL identity. These developments are interesting for 
two principal reasons. 
First, Navy SEALs have traditionally shunned publicity, and are supposed to 
adhere to an ethos of quiet professionalism, otherwise known as the SEAL Ethos. One 
interpretation of the current environment is that, perhaps, attitudes within the SEAL 
community overall have shifted with respect to the acceptable use of the SEAL identity 
as a self-promotion and publicity tool. Indeed, emerging to take advantage of the SEALs’ 
skyrocketing popularity is a new political and social pressure group of former SEALs 
with a distinct SEAL counterculture. Within this subculture there has been a shift away 
from the traditional SEAL Ethos of quiet professionalism toward a Market Ethos of 
commercialization and self-promotion. Put another way, it appears that many former 
SEALs have adopted a position that is counter to Naval Special Warfare’s (NSW) 
traditional norms, namely, an adherence to a code of ethics that discourages profiting 
from or making a spectacle of one’s membership in the SEAL Teams. 
Second, the deliberate—and ironic—efforts by former SEALs, the White House, 
Naval Special Warfare Command (NSWC), and society writ large to profit from NSW’s 
popularity have eliminated any and all mystique surrounding the Navy SEALs. These 
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promotional activities are ironic because, from a military effectiveness perspective, they 
are “anti-functional,” meaning that they do not support the SEALs’ security role on 
behalf of society. The dual requirements of security and surprise necessary for successful 
special operations forces (SOF) missions do not fit within such a promotional construct.2  
Questions that arise given these two developments are: How can the SEALs—or 
any special operations units for that matter—perform their roles effectively when SOF 
practitioners, society, and the government are over-saturating the market with 
increasingly revealing and detailed commentary about special operations in real-time? 
Why has martial theater taken precedence over national security demands at a time when 
the men and women of SOF are still very much engaged in direct and indirect actions 
around the world?3 Why have so many SEALs traded NSW’s hard-earned credibility to 
tarry with special interest groups, partisan political action committees, and corporate 
sponsors for a mere fifteen minutes of fame?  
This paper examines these trends, and the extent, causes, and consequences of 
leveraging the U.S. Navy SEALs for entertainment value, for profit, and for political use. 
The following analysis questions the logic—or illogic—associated with these efforts. I 
will argue that the raising of Navy SEALs to celebrity status through media exploitation 
and publicity stunts has corrupted the culture of the SEAL community by incentivizing 
narcissistic and profit-oriented behavior. Ultimately, this behavior erodes military 
effectiveness, damages national security, and undermines healthy civil-military relations.   
Society’s acceptance of the Navy SEALs’ new public persona points to a 
fundamental change in the values that define the normative relationship between elite 
units like the SEALs and society. Scholars and uniformed military members have yet to 
give proper attention to this evolving relationship. Much of the scholarship on special 
                                                 
2 See William McRaven, SPECOPS: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and 
Practice (New York, NY: Presidio Press, 1995). 
3 Linda Robinson, “The Future of U.S. Special Operations Forces,” Council on Foreign Relations, 
Council Special Report no. 66, April 2013. Her monograph offers a good general understanding of the 
strategic utility and employment of SOF. 
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operations over the last decade has focused on theory, strategy, capabilities, and policy.4 
Where this project differs is by moving beyond the usual arguments to delve into social 
psychology, organizational culture, and the new tensions exerted by 21st century 
infotainment demands. 
First, I will provide a description of the SEAL Ethos as a basis for understanding 
the normative and functional aspects of NSW’s most trenchant cultural assumption, quiet 
professionalism. I will then argue that the quiet professional ethic has failed as a guiding 
cultural tenet, and that fame has corrupted the SEAL ecosystem. Second, I will provide 
several recent indicators of the extent of this corruption. Third, I will discuss some key 
events that likely contributed to a shift in SEAL thinking. Fourth, I will borrow 
extensively from Pierre Bourdieu and his theory about the “forms of capital” in order to 
conceptualize the transformation from SEAL Ethos to Market Ethos. Fifth, I will discuss 
the consequences of these changes as they relate to military effectiveness, national 
security, and civil-military relations. Sixth, I will address some important 
counterarguments. In the final chapter I will highlight current efforts by NSW to counter 
these trends as it tries to adapt to its new fame, and I will offer some additional thoughts 
and propose some new means of redress. 
                                                 
4  See Harry R. Yarger, “21st Century SOF: Toward a Theory of American Special Operations,” JSOU 
Report 13–1, April 2013; Michele L. Malvesti, “To Serve the Nation: U.S. Special Operations Forces in an 
Era of Conflict,” Center for a New American Security, June 2010; James D. Kiras, Special Operations and 
Strategy: From World War II to the War on Terrorism (New York, NY: Routledge Press, 2006); Robert G. 
Spulak, Jr., A Theory of Special Operations: The Origin, Qualities, and Uses of SOF (Hurlburt Field, FL: 
The JSOU Press, 2007); John B. Alexander, The Changing Nature of Warfare, the Factors Mediating 
Future Conflict, and Implications for SOF (Hurlburt Field, FL: The JSOU Press, 2006); David Tucker and 
Christopher J. Lamb, United States Special Operations Forces  (New York, NY: Columbia University 
Press, 2007); Joseph D. Celeski, “Strategic Employment of SOF in a UW Environment,” Special Warfare 
21, no. 4 (Jul/Aug, 2008). 
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II. HISTORY AND UTILITY OF THE SEAL ETHOS 
When I enlisted in 1997, the Navy SEALs did not have an official ethos. Instead, 
we adhered to a set of internalized cultural assumptions and ethics that were passed down 
from “old guy” to “new guy.” The behavior emphasized most was that of “quiet 
professionalism.” This is the ethic that has helped shape the culture of the U.S. Navy 
SEAL Teams since their inception in 1962, and arguably the very ethic that enabled their 
current successes. This fundamental principle has perhaps been put best by an 
anonymous, unseen SEAL in a 1969 Navy-sanctioned documentary about the Navy 
SEALs. In conveying to the viewers where SEALs stand on publicity and self-
aggrandizement the speaker says: 
We’re more or less an unsung soldier in a lot of respects, because they 
can’t write up a lot of the things we do. But I said, within yourself you’ll 
know. You’ll have this personal pride that you was there, and you did the 
job. After the war they’ll probably write about it. But if you are in here for 
just getting the Bronze Star and your name on the front page, no you 
won’t—because they don’t put our name on the front page. But you’ll 
know within yourself. You’ll know what your buddies have done and 
you’ll know our record.5 
This quiet professional ethic was about more than just humility and camaraderie. 
It served a functional purpose by safeguarding the SEALs’ operational ambiguity. 
Samuel Huntington describes such a professional ethic this way: “A value or attitude is 
part of the professional ethic if it is implied by or derived from the peculiar expertise, 
responsibility, and organization of the military profession.”6 SEALs need operational 
ambiguity to ensure they can conduct missions at a comparative advantage vis-à-vis the 
enemy. The American public does not need to know exactly what SEALs do, nor how 
they do it when executing missions. Arguably, the public only needs to know that a rare 
breed of man is willing to put his life on the line to protect America and its interests.  
                                                 
5 “MEN WITH GREEN FACES,” YouTube video, 28:53, posted by PublicResourcesOrg, July 22, 
2010, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nzkeqJMfPN4. 
6 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), 
61. 
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The speaker in the documentary referenced above also alluded to the idea that the 
narrative did not belong to him, but that “they” had the responsibility of determining the 
time and place of any disclosures. “They” can be interpreted to be the Navy, the White 
House, or the Pentagon. The point is that the speaker, and the men of his era, realized that 
NSW did not exist for its own sake, but that the organization was a tool of foreign policy. 
Drawing attention to the organization undermined the very reason for its existence. Or, so 
implies the SEAL Ethos.  
A. GENESIS AND MEANING OF AN ETHOS 
In 2005, NSW leadership decided that the SEALs needed something more akin to 
a codified ethos than an unspoken rule. As a result, approximately 50 active duty and 
retired SEALs of various ranks and experience levels gathered on San Clemente Island to 
contemplate the SEAL archetype. The goal was to define the standard by which all 
SEALs could measure themselves. Through their efforts, the SEAL Ethos was born. The 
following is an excerpt from the SEAL Ethos. The bold sections reflect four key aspects 
of “quiet professionalism” as I understand it (emphasis mine). 
My Trident is a symbol of honor and heritage.7 Bestowed upon me by the 
heroes that have gone before, it embodies the trust of those I have sworn 
to protect. By wearing the Trident I accept the responsibility of my 
chosen profession and way of life. It is a privilege that I must earn every 
day. My loyalty to Country and Team is beyond reproach. I humbly serve 
as a guardian to my fellow Americans always ready to defend those who 
are unable to defend themselves. I do not advertise the nature of my 
work, nor seek recognition for my actions. I voluntarily accept the 
inherent hazards of my profession, placing the welfare and security of 
others before my own. I serve with honor on and off the battlefield. The 
ability to control my emotions and my actions, regardless of circumstance, 
sets me apart from other men. Uncompromising integrity is my standard. 
My character and honor are steadfast. My word is my bond.8  
Let us look more closely at each of these tenets of the SEAL Ethos: 
                                                 
7 The golden Trident is the insignia that all SEALs wear on their uniform and it is the most 
recognizable symbol of the SEAL Teams. 
8 For the full script see Appendix or SEAL + SWCC: Official Naval Special Warfare website, 
http://www.sealswcc.com/navy-seals-ethos.html#.Vj3Ap4QkLih. 
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1. “My Trident is a symbol of honor and heritage.”9 The golden Trident is 
the most recognizable symbol of the SEAL Teams. It bestows upon the 
wearer the credibility of the organization. A recent trend amongst former 
SEALs is to place a small Trident pin on the lapel of their suit coat in 
social settings. It says, “Look at me, I am a U.S. Navy SEAL. Trust what I 
have to say. After all, we killed Osama bin Laden.” When SEALs wear the 
pin, but then act contrary to NSW’s core values, they erode NSW’s 
credibility, and besmirch the Trident’s honor and heritage.  
2. “By wearing the Trident I accept the responsibility of my chosen 
profession and way of life. It is a privilege that I must earn every day.”10 
SEALs, both past and present, have a responsibility to uphold the SEAL 
ideal. That includes accepting a way of life somewhat different than 
society’s. Social critics tell us that America’s values have become 
“narcissistic, morally relativist, self-indulgent, hedonistic, consumerist, 
individualistic, victim-centered, nihilistic, and soft.”11 These are not 
SEAL values, yet many of the SEALs in the public eye appear to adhere 
to, if not exemplify, these new norms. 
3. “I do not advertise the nature of my work, nor seek recognition for my 
actions.”12 This may be the most oft-quoted line in the SEAL Ethos, 
especially by those who subscribe to a stricter interpretation of the 
verbiage. And though the bounds of what should/should not be publicly 
discussed are subject to interpretation, one cannot deny that dozens of 
SEALs have recently chosen to “advertise the nature of their work,” “seek 
recognition for their actions,”13 and turn a profit. 
4. “I serve with honor on and off the battlefield.”14 The commitment to the 
SEAL Ethos is supposed to be lifelong. Every active duty and former 
SEAL is responsible for upholding the tradition of excellence no matter 
when his active service ends. Non-disclosure agreements are legally 
binding. The SEAL Ethos is ethically binding. Whether on the battlefield 
or in the boardroom, SEALs must strive to preserve their honor, even in 
the face of spectacular public adulation and fame. 
The SEAL Ethos establishes a set of principles that those who earn and wear the 
SEAL Trident ostensibly share. These beliefs and values have been assumed by many to 
                                                 
9 Navy SEAL Ethos. 
10 Navy SEAL Ethos. 
11 John Hillen, “Must U.S. Military Culture Reform?” Orbis 43, no. 1 (Winter 1999): 53. 
12 Navy SEAL Ethos. 
13 Navy SEAL Ethos. 
14 Navy SEAL Ethos. 
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transcend active duty service, especially since SEALs typically regard themselves as 
SEALs for life. However, somewhere along the line, particularly over the course of the 
past decade, something has broken down. One could argue that the Ethos has failed to 
inspire quiet professionalism in its target audience, namely the SEALs.  
B. WARNING SIGNS 
In a 2014 letter directed at Navy SEALs past and present, the current commander 
of NSWC, Rear Admiral Brian L. Losey, called for an end to the casualness with which a 
growing number of former SEALs have been discussing SEAL operations and exposing 
NSW to unsanctioned publicity. Rear Admiral Losey wrote:  
At Naval Special Warfare’s core is the SEAL Ethos. A critical tenant of 
our Ethos is “I do not advertise the nature of my work, nor seek 
recognition for my actions.” Our Ethos is a life-long commitment and 
obligation, both in and out of the service. Violators of our Ethos are 
neither teammates in good standing, nor teammates who represent Naval 
Special Warfare. We do not abide willful or selfish disregard for our core 
values in return for public notoriety and financial gain, which only 
diminishes otherwise honorable service, courage, and sacrifice.15  
Rear Admiral Losey’s message came on the heels of the announcement that the 
“The Man Who Killed Osama bin Laden” would reveal himself on Fox News in 
November 2014. Yet, in the years and months before Robert O’Neill’s appearance on 
Fox, dozens of former SEALs had cast aside their anonymity to create a commodified 
and public persona. Just two years before Rear Admiral Losey’s letter, the previous NSW 
commander issued a similar plea to the SEAL community. Rear Admiral Sean Pybus 
wrote: 
I am disappointed, embarrassed and concerned. Most of us have always 
thought that the privilege of working with some of our nation’s toughest 
warriors on challenging missions would be enough to be proud of, with no 
further compensation or celebrity required. Today, we find former SEALs 
headlining positions in a presidential campaign; hawking details about a 
mission against Enemy Number 1; and generally selling other aspects of 
                                                 
15 For a full text of the letter see Kelsey Harkness, “Top Navy SEAL Officials Aren’t Happy with 




NSW training and operations. For an elite force that should be humble and 
disciplined for life, we are certainly not appearing to be so. We owe our 
chain of command much better than this.16 
These letters by NSW’s top commanders signal that the level of self-
aggrandizement and inappropriate media exposure by former SEALs has reached an 
unmanageable and potentially damaging level. According to NSW’s leaders, SEALs 
should know better than to advertise the nature of their work because there is a real 
enemy out there who is attentive, and is constantly seeking an advantage. SEALs should 
also know better than to seek recognition for their actions because that diminishes the 
efforts of the team, and erodes the credibility of the organization. When members seek to 
promote their own actions, they do so not for the good of the team, but for their own 
benefit.  
American society writ large has deemed it reasonable to grant SEALs broad 
legitimacy based on a handful of highly publicized military missions, such as the raid that 
killed Osama bin Laden. These tendencies have nurtured a growing fame that has carried 
with it concomitant opportunities to profit from that fame. As NSW’s leaders have 
pointed out, these tendencies appear to be at odds with the SEAL Ethos and quiet 
professionalism in general. A big question that confronts our special operations forces 
today is whether Admirals Pybus and Losey are correct. Or, has the need for such an 
ethic become obsolete? One might be forgiven for thinking so, especially given how 
many former SEALs have embraced the limelight. Yet, in my view, given the nature of 
the current threat environment, the speed of information flows, and the connectedness of 
America’s 21st century adversaries, special operations units, to include the SEALs, need 
to actually maintain even greater professionalism, secrecy, and operational ambiguity  
 
 
                                                 
16 Barbara Star, “Scathing Message Sent to Navy SEALs on Discussing Secret Work,” Fox2Now, 
September 5, 2012, http://fox2now.com/2012/09/05/scathing-message-sent-to-navy-seals-on-discussing-
secret-work/. 
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with respect to their methods and capabilities.17 To me, quiet professionalism remains a 
key element in safeguarding national security, building trust relationships, ensuring 
freedom of maneuver, and, most importantly, protecting the lives of our men and women 
in uniform.  
                                                 
17 For a description of 21st century threats see Donald C. Winter, “Adapting to the Threat Dynamics 
of the 21st Century,” The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2603, September 15, 2011, 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/09/adapting-to-the-threat-dynamics-of-the-21st-century. 
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III. CULTURAL CHANGE OR CULTURAL CORRUPTION? 
What, then, are some indicators that publicity around the Navy SEALs has 
increased? A LexisNexis key phrase search of “U.S. Navy SEAL” shows a 400% and 
1000% increase in reporting in the Washington Post and the New York Times, 
respectively, since 2001. Navy SEAL-related reporting in U.S. journals also rose 400% 
since 2001. A Google key phrase search of “U.S. Navy SEAL 2001” shows a jump from 
1.2 million search results in 2001 to 46.1 million in 2015. But perhaps the best evidence 
that the Navy SEALs have become increasingly newsworthy is found in media headlines. 
The following is just a sampling of headlines from 2015. 
 “UCLA wearing cool Navy SEAL tribute helmets Saturday” 
 “Transgender ex-SEAL Kristin Beck: My mission to help” 
 “Former Navy SEAL smashes wingsuit distance record in daring flight” 
 “Haute scene LA: Navy SEAL Foundation honors Clint Eastwood” 
 “Navy SEALs save ‘President’ Donald Trump’s hair in unaired SNL 
sketch” 
 “Former Navy SEAL commander explains the philosophy that made his 
unit the most decorated of the Iraq War” 
 “6 crucial career lessons we can all learn from the Navy SEALs” 
 “VIDEO: What Hollywood Gets Wrong About Navy SEALs, According 
to Badass Navy SEALs” 
 “Millionaire hires Navy SEAL to shape him up” 
 “If You’re Lying About Being a Navy SEAL, This Man Will Catch You” 
 “Wanted: Handsome, educated Navy SEAL for friends-with-benefits” 
 “HELL YEAH! Navy SEAL Marcus Luttrell Issues Brutal Message To 
Obama #Chattanooga” 
These headlines reflect both society’s interest in the SEALs, and also the 
deliberate efforts by some SEALs to seek publicity. For these publicity-seeking SEALs, 
where does the SEAL Ethos end and acceptable self-promotion begin? How has the 
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SEALs’ understanding of themselves and of their responsibilities to the SEAL Ethos 
undergone revision? Former Navy-SEAL-turned-media-personality Brandon Webb 
nicely captured the climate emerging in the former SEAL community during an interview 
for Men’s Journal when he proclaimed, “Right now the SEALs are having their moment, 
and I intend to ride this wave as far as I can.”18 
A. CHANGING CLIMATE 
Mr. Webb represents perhaps the best example of the 21st Century deviant 
SEAL—and here I use deviant in its technical sense to describe someone who defies the 
norms of his particular culture.19 In general, Mr. Webb has created a business around 
advertising the nature of his work and seeking recognition for his actions. 
After a short stint in the SEAL Teams, Mr. Webb founded Force12 Media, which, 
according to Men’s Journal is “a network of military-themed websites with Hollywood 
deals and a publishing imprint. His flagship site, SOFREP (Special Operations Forces 
Situation Report), hires former SEALs, Green Berets, and Army Rangers to write about 
the U.S.’s clandestine wars around the globe.”20 Mr. Webb is the author of numerous 
non-fiction SEAL books, and openly encourages SEALs and other special operations 
personnel to publish their own books through his publishing imprint. For instance, the 
following describes the partnership between SOFREP and the publishing company, St. 
Martin’s Press: 
St Martin’s Press editor Marc Resnick has negotiated a deal with 
SOFREP.COM (Special Operations Forces Report) [sic] to publish hard-
hitting, news-breaking original e-books from the world of Special 
Operations. With millions of visitors monthly, SOFREP is the largest Spec 
Ops site on the Internet devoted to authentic, accurate, and timely 
                                                 
18 Stayton Bonner, “Navy SEAL Inc.,” Men’s Journal, June 2015, 
http://www.mensjournal.com/magazine/navy-seal-inc-20150519. 
19 Vijay Sathe, Culture and Related Corporate Realities (Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin INC., 
1985). 
20 Bonner, “Navy SEAL Inc.” 
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analysis of Special Operations, Intelligence, and foreign policy issues that 
affect the United States (emphasis mine).21 
One might wonder about the purpose of devoting a site to the “authentic, accurate, 
and timely analysis of Special Operations.” Does such an entity help or harm the men and 
women still serving in special operations roles? According to Force12 Media’s own 
website, “[Its] niche network reaches over 40 million monthly. The audience is over 21, 
mostly male, and smart.”22 How critical is it that 40 million 21-year-old males are up to 
date on contemporary U.S. special operations? Are efforts like Mr. Webb’s driving the 
market? Or, is a market for special operations information driving the commercialization 
of SOF? 
Force12 Media also owns NavySEALs.com, which, according to the website, is 
“The only authentic Navy SEAL media property on the Internet, managed and run  
by former Navy SEALs. NavySEALs.com provides community news, training,  
recruiting and fitness tips.”23 Of course, the problem here is that NavySEALs.com cannot 
be considered authentic, because NSW does not officially endorse it. In fact, according to 
the Navy SEAL + SWCC Scout Team, which is NSW’s recruiting arm, the information 
promulgated on Mr. Webb’s website and others like it is almost always wrong.  
One unfortunate consequence is that NSW must then continually try to reeducate 
potential recruits.24 Why NSW does not own the Internet domain name 
www.NavySEALs.com remains a mystery, but the fact that it does not highlights the 
degree to which NSW has little to no control over former SEALs and their promotional 
(and self-promotional) activities. 
B. BOOKS 
Arguably, the most tried-and-true method of self-promotion is via the publishing 
industry. From 1962 to 2010, only 80 or so books total about SEALs had appeared. 
                                                 
21 “St. Martin’s Press Teams with SOFREP for EBooks,” Soldier Systems, September 28, 2013, 
http://soldiersystems.net/2013/09/28/st-martins-press-teams-with-sofrep-for-ebooks/. 
22 Force12 Media, http://force12media.com. 
23 Force12 Media, http://force12media.com. 
24 Navy SEAL + SWCC Scout Team employee, in discussion with the author, July 2015. 
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Between 2011 (bin Laden’s death) and 2015, that number increased by 200%. Of these 
new books, over 75% were authored by SEALs:25 after bin Laden’s death, it was as if a 
dam had burst (Figure 1).  
Figure 1.  Navy SEAL-Related Books: 1962–2015 
 
The Defense Office of Prepublication Security Review (DOPSR) confirms this general 
growth curve, and notes a significant boost in SEAL books starting in 2012. DOPSR 
chose not to share exact numbers.26 
Typically, in the past, if a SEAL wrote a book it would have been about decades-
old operations. There are exceptions, such as Richard Marcinko’s book Rogue Warrior, 
and a few others.27 But, in the main, SEALs avoided turning their service into a 
commodified story immediately upon leaving active duty. Former SEALs today 
apparently see things differently, and have seized on the lucrative opportunity to cash in 
on their service. Several recently separated-from-active-duty SEALs are now prolific 
writers, with two, three, or more books published. To be fair, as long as former service 
members submit their manuscripts to the Department of Defense (DoD) for pre-
publication security review there is no legal issue with their right to publish. However, 
the question is less about whether they can publish, and more about whether they should 
                                                 
25 There is room for error here with regard to exact numbers. Amazon.com and GoodReads.com were 
my main sources. There are certainly more books about SEALs. The relevant point is the jump in numbers 
after bin Laden’s death. 
26 DOPSR employee, in discussion with the author, June 2015. 
27 Richard Marcinko, Rogue Warrior (New York, NY: Pocket Books, 1992). 
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publish. The sheer number of SEAL-authored books represents a departure from the pre-
9/11 norm, and a general tendency by SEALs to embrace a Market Ethos rather than the 
SEAL Ethos. 
C. POLITICS AND THE MEDIA 
If books represent an avenue for SEALs to make money, politics offers an avenue 
for SEALs to access power and popularity of a different sort. Over the past few years, it 
could appear to an outside observer that SEALs have become what the famed sociologist 
Morris Janowitz would call a “political pressure group.”28 Former SEALs have been 
appearing more regularly on media networks as contributors and analysts. They are 
weighing in on a range of politically charged topics, and their viewpoints are often very 
partisan. For instance, a Google search with the keywords “Navy SEAL MSNBC” returns 
306,000 hits, “Navy SEAL CNN” returns 512,000 hits, and “Navy SEAL Fox News” 
returns 3,620,000 hits. According to a 2014 Pew Research report, Fox News consistently 
leans conservative, while MSNBC consistently leans progressive. The same Pew 
Research report states that Republicans and Democrats are more divided along 
ideological lines now than at any point in the last twenty years.29  
If Navy SEALs are ten times more likely to appear on a conservative media 
channel than a progressive media channel, this could create the perception that SEALs 
ideologically lean right. This could then lead biased media to actively search out former 
SEALs and have them speak as partisans on certain topics with the added credibility of 
their being SEALs. The latest example of just such a phenomenon involves former 
SEALs Jocko Willink and Leif Babin, who have recently made media appearances with 
the release of their new book Extreme Ownership: How U.S. Navy SEALs Lead and Win. 
Within days of publishing their book, both men appeared on Fox News criticizing 
President Obama’s policies on military spending, and the fight against Daesh in Iraq and 
                                                 
28 Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York, NY: The 
Free Press, 1971). 
29 “Political Polarization in the American Public,” Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 
June 12, 2014, http://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public/. 
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Syria.30 The progression from publishing a benign book on leadership to becoming 
immediate pawns in a political debate shows the slippery slope that awaits SEALs who 
market their identities and pursue public personas in the wake of SEAL fame. At a 
minimum, perceptions of partisanship brand SEALs a certain way—something that 
critics might say borders on media exploitation and use of SEALs for domestic 
propaganda. 
In recent years, several conservative-leaning political action committees (PACs) 
have appeared with former SEALs as their front men. These include Special Operations 
OPSEC Education Fund, Special Operations Speaks, Veterans for a Strong America, 
Supporting Electing American Leaders (SEAL PAC), and Special Operations for 
America. One political advertisement in 2012 for the PAC Veterans for a Strong America 
starred four former SEALs who claimed that over 95% of the active duty SEAL 
community would not be voting for President Obama in the reelection.31 These men form 
the core of what is becoming a special interest pressure group that uses the credibility of 
special operations to push partisan politics. Two of those men, Ryan Zinke and Scott 
Taylor, are now elected lawmakers.32 A third man, Brad Nagel, works for Donald 
Trump’s presidential campaign.33 The fourth man, Ben Smith, is involved in Virginia 
legislator Scott Taylor’s PAC Special Operations OPSEC Fund, and regularly engages in 
anti-government and anti-Muslim rhetoric. He has even gone so far as to intentionally 
drop a Koran on the ground at the South Carolina Tea Party Coalition Convention to 
show his disdain for Islam. The video is posted on YouTube, with the title “WATCH: 
                                                 
30 “PRESIDENT OBAMA THREATENING TO VETO MILITARY SPENDING BILL,” YouTube 
video, 4:34, from Fox News on October 20, 2015, posted by “FOXS NEWS,” October 20, 2015, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x7urxU9MMsI; “FORMER NAVY SEALS REACT TO OBAMA’S 
PLANS FOR SYRIA,” YouTube video, 4:44, from Fox News on November 01, 2015, posted by “Tea 
Party,” November 01, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H-vG3FBR_QA. 
31 “NAVY SEALS EXPOSE OBAMA,” YouTube video, 3:20, from Veterans for a Strong America 
on November 3, 2012, posted by “Veterans for a Strong America,” November, 3 2012, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o3kK5neqzHE. 
32 Ryan Zinke is Montana’s congressman and Scott Taylor serves in the Virginia House of Delegates 
for the 85th district. 
33 “Trump Hires Three More Iowa Based Operatives,” The Iowa Republican, April 7, 2015, 
http://theiowarepublican.com/2015/trump-hires-three-more-iowa-based-operatives/. 
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SEAL Ben Smith Drops Koran on Ground.”34 Mr. Smith’s Facebook name is even 
“Former Navy SEAL Benjamin Smith.”35 Separately, former SEAL Carl Higbie, who 
was kicked out of the Navy for writing a book critical of the Obama administration, told 
Fox News that 90% of those in uniform did not support President Obama.36  
Questions any reasonable observer would be right to ask are: Where is the 
evidence to back up what these men are saying, and why is anybody listening to their 
unsubstantiated claims in the first place? Also, why are their assertions being broadcast, 
as if their (sometimes short) time in the SEAL Teams qualifies them to comment on such 
matters in a meaningful way? Take the following statement from another former SEAL 
Christopher Mark Heben, who told Fox News, “Let me make something very clear: 
nobody that wears a Navy SEAL Trident on their chest…nobody is a fan of Obama, 
nobody is a fan of Hillary Clinton period.”37 Unfortunately for Mr. Heben, he spoke too 
soon, as Hillary Clinton’s campaign has also jumped on the SEAL bandwagon for 2016. 
In one of Mrs. Clinton’s presidential campaign videos a former SEAL named Eric 
Gardiner has the following to say, “As a former SEAL, as a veteran, I’m confident 
knowing that Hillary as commander-in-chief will have a sense for the gravity of her 
decisions at that level.”38  
Indeed, it appears many political hopefuls have bet on a piece of the SEAL magic 
in 2016. For instance, no fewer than six former SEALs were on stage with Governor Rick 
                                                 
34 “WATCH: SEAL BEN SMITH DROPS KORAN ON GROUND,” YouTube video, 3:22, from 
South Carolina Tea Part Coalition on January 19, 2014, posted by “Western Journalism,” January 27, 2014, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hq0zBNS7q8c. 
35 Benjamin Smith’s facebook Page, https://www.facebook.com/SEALBenjaminSmith/. 
36 “NAVY SEAL CARL HIGBIE: OVER 90% OF TROOPS DO NOT SUPPORT OBAMA,” 
YouTube video, 2:40, from Fox News on September 18, 2014, posted by “Washington Free Beacon,” 
September, 18 2014, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bnc2FiSYvjM. 
37 “Nobody That Wears A Navy SEAL Trident Is A Fan Of Obama Or Hillary,” Fox Nation, 
http://nation.foxnews.com/2014/01/19/seal-nobody-wears-navy-seal-trident-fan-obama-or-hillary. 
38 Paul Bedard, “Navy SEAL, Obama, Republican Gates praise Clinton in new video,” Washington 
Examiner, October 19, 2015, http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/navy-seal-obama-republican-gates-
praise-clinton-in-new-video/article/2574403. 
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Perry when he announced his (now failed) presidential bid.39 Also, at least two former 
SEALs are running for political office in 2016. Take the first transgender Navy SEAL, 
Kristen Beck, who is running for Congress in Maryland.40 She typically sports a Trident 
pin on her civilian dress, along with her medals. Former SEAL Eric Greitens is running 
for governor of Missouri, and his campaign page is not without blatant SEAL symbology 
as well. 
These candidates may be taking their cues from Congressman Zinke, who won 
Montana’s congressional seat in 2014. Zinke emplaced the SEAL Trident emblem on his 
campaign bus. Indeed, it is difficult to find a picture of him in which there is not a Trident 
pinned somewhere to his suit. It does not stop there though, as Congressman Zinke has 
now enlisted the help of Robert O’Neill (“The man who killed Osama bin Laden”) to 
solicit contributions for the political action committee SEAL PAC. The following is an 
excerpt from an e-mail solicitation that a colleague of mine received from Robert O’Neill 
in support of SEAL PAC: 
Friend, my name is Robert O’Neill. You may recognize my name. I’m a 
former U.S. Navy SEAL. I served on SEAL TEAM SIX, and I took part in 
more than 400 missions—including some of the most high-risk and high-
profile missions that have recently been turned into Hollywood films. I’m 
e-mailing you today because I know you care greatly about our nation and 
its future. You likely share my frustrations and like many Americans—
including a strong majority of our active duty military and veterans—
believe that ineffective leadership from career politicians in Washington, 
D.C. has put our great country on a dangerous path to disaster both at 
home and on the international stage. Friend, that’s why I’m standing with 
SEAL PAC, and why I hope you will too. You see: this organization, 
founded by 23-year SEAL Veteran and current Congressman Ryan Zinke 
of Montana, has a clear mission—to elect more veterans and like-minded 
leaders to serve in Congress. Friend, I’m inviting you to stand with me by 
joining SEAL PAC with a contribution at the $20, $35, or $50 level, or 
even $100 or $250 if you’re able. When you join today, your name will be 
entered in a drawing to win a U.S. Navy SEAL Battle Flag, which I have 
                                                 
39 Katie Pavlich, “Flanked By Navy SEALS, Rick Perry Will Announce He’s Running For President 
Today,” TownHall.com, June 4, 2015, http://townhall.com/tipsheet/katiepavlich/2015/06/04/rick-perry-to-
announce-presidential-plans-surrounded-by-american-heros-special-ops-veterans-n2008046. 
40 Maxwell Tani, “Kristin Beck, Transgender Former Navy Seal, To Run Against Steny Hoyer,” 
Huffington Post, February 12, 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/02/12/kristin-
beck_n_6673744.html. 
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personally signed and prepared for delivery. Hurry, this contest ends on 
Veteran’s Day—November 11th.41 
Former Navy SEAL Robert O’Neill—the man who killed Osama bin Laden—is sending 
signed Navy SEAL flags to Americans willing to donate money to Congressman Zinke’s 
political action committee. How can the symbol of an apolitical military unit be used in 
such a partisan way without any protest from society or the military? 
My point, meanwhile, is not that these individuals do not have a right to get 
involved in politics or support a particular candidate. But, rather, they are using the 
SEALs’ credibility and current popularity as a heuristic to affect Americans’ decision-
making. The problem, in my view, is that most of these men appear with a Navy SEAL 
Trident emblem on their lapels, and the banners that unscroll across the bottom of the TV 
screen clearly state that these individuals were/are Navy SEALs.  
The civil-military relations issues here are profound. As Morris Janowitz explains, 
“By means of its professional organizations, more than by post-retirement employment 
activities, the military elite operate as a pressure group and place strains on the traditional 
formula of civil-military relations.”42 Eliot Cohen, in his study of elite military units, 
contends that “Elite units may be misleading or ambiguous symbols, distorting serious 
public and governmental discussion of complex issues, encouraging instead a 
preoccupation with martial theater.”43 As previously described, there are already signs of 
a shift in this direction, with SEALs commenting on such politically charged topics as 
gun control, Ebola, Benghazi, military spending, and Bowe Bergdahl. There appears to 
be a strong “halo effect” whereby society deems that if the SEALs can kill bin Laden, 
then their opinions must be worth listening to on a plethora of unrelated issues. Or, as 
Erving Goffman describes this phenomenon: “Audiences tend to accept the self projected 
                                                 
41 A fellow SEAL received this solicitation in an e-mail from SEALPAC in November 2015. 
42 Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, 374. 
43 Eliot Cohen, Commandos and Politicians: Elite Military Units in Modern Democracies 
(Cambridge, MA: Center for International Affairs Harvard University, 1978), 65. 
20
by the individual performer during any current performance as a responsible 
representative of his colleague-grouping, of his team, and of his social establishment.”44  
What Janowitz, Cohen, and Goffman seem to be hinting at is that there are 
possible dangers when a polity grants blanket credibility to an individual or organization 
based solely on its status or fame—credibility that, in this case, realistically derives from 
a very narrowly defined military skillset that may not necessarily transition to social 
issues. As an example of such blanket credibility given to SEALs, take this testimonial 
from ExBellum’s website: 
As a psychologist who studies them, a team member who works alongside 
them, and a professional in the applicant screening industry, learning 
someone is a former Navy SEAL would lead me to recommend hiring him 
knowing little else about him. They are that good! – Joshua D. Cotton, 
Ph.D. 45 
Should we take Mr. Cotton’s word for this simply because he has a Ph.D.? No, 
just as we should not take a SEAL’s word for something just because he is a SEAL, 
especially in the realm of politics. Although Janowitz advises that professional soldiers 
should be “above politics,” he likewise recognizes that men in unconventional careers 
involving politico-military duties are especially attuned to “political consciousness.”46 If 
this is true, SEALs should realize the danger in using organizational credibility to engage 
in partisan politics. Like all Americans, SEALs hold important political perspectives. 
NSW’s duty, however, is to ensure the protection of all citizens, regardless of their 
political leanings. As Richard Kohn points out, “Surely partisanship undermines public 
confidence in the objectivity and loyalty of the military and by association in the policies 
of their civilian masters.”47  
To sum up thus far, the numbers of books published, media appearances made, 
and political stunts used are evidence that many former Navy SEALs are evolving in how 
44 Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (New York, NY: Random House, 1959), 
242. 
45 ExBellum: Emergent Leadership Solutions, https://www.exbellum.com/about. 
46 Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, 234–235. 
47 Richard H. Kohn, “Tarnished Brass: Is the U.S. Military Profession in Decline?,” World Affairs 
171, no. 4 (Spring 2009): 79. 
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they interact with society. There is currently no commonly agreed upon line between 
what is acceptable and unacceptable behavior post active duty service, but the use of the 
SEAL brand as a political weapon or as a marketing tool is at clear odds with the SEAL 
Ethos. Alternatively, we might also conclude that the Ethos itself is up for grabs, as 
former SEALs increasingly promote their SEALness for personal gain. Even more 
worrisome, the public’s adulation of SEALs points to the extreme vulnerability of NSW’s 
reputation overall, as the SEAL brand diffuses across new and unmanaged venues. All of 
this begs the question: what kind of control does NSWC really have over the SEAL brand 
if any SEAL can hijack NSW’s symbolic capital for personal gain, whether in the 
realm(s) of infotainment, entertainment, or politics?  
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IV. POLITICS, PUBLICITY STUNTS, AND MIXED MESSAGES—
SETTING THE CONDITIONS FOR FAME 
A. POLITICS 
One could well make the argument that the publicity given to the SEALs due to a 
handful of high-profile military operations was the spark that ignited NSW’s rise to 
prominence in contemporary American culture. Maybe the most widely known of these 
missions was the raid by SEALs on May 1–2, 2011, which resulted in the death of Osama 
bin Laden.48 In the days and weeks following the operation, several individuals in the 
administration spoke openly about the details of the raid. Vice President Biden 
commented publicly that SEALs had conducted the operation; Secretary of Defense 
Panetta allegedly released classified details at an awards dinner in the presence of Zero 
Dark Thirty scriptwriter Mark Boal; and several administration officials went on record 
with the press about the operation.49 Freedom of Information Act requests by Judicial 
Watch revealed that the White House intentionally leaked sensitive and classified 
information to the press and to the filmmakers of Zero Dark Thirty.50  
                                                 
   48 A Google Trends search with the key word “U.S. Navy SEAL” shows the spike in interest 
following the bin Laden raid. This correlates with data from Navy SEAL + SWCC Scout Team. NSW’s 
official website received so much traffic after bin Laden’s death that the server shut down. (Navy SEAL + 
SWCC Scout Team employee, in discussion with this author, July 2015). 
49 See Tony Harnden, “Joe Biden Opens His Mouth about U.S. Navy SEALs,” The Telegraph, May 4, 
2011, http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/tobyharnden/100086416/joe-biden-opens-his-mouth-about-us-
navy-seals/; “CIA Papers Show Leon Panetta Revealed bin Laden Secrets,” Politico, December 11, 2013, 
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/12/cia-papers-show-leon-panetta-revealed-bin-laden-secrets-
100993.html; Rowan Scarborough, “Details of bin Laden raid leaked first by Obama aides,” Washington 
Times, September 16, 2012, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/sep/16/details-of-bin-laden-raid-
leaked-first-by-aides/?page=all. (Zero Dark Thirty is a movie about the efforts to find and capture Osama 
bin Laden. The movie also depicts the SEALs’ part in the raid). 
50 See Judicial Watch, 15 November 2012, http://www.judicialwatch.org/press-room/press-
releases/obama-administration-admits-information-released-to-zero-dark-thirty-filmmakers-might-pose-an-




The conservative media claims that the bin Laden raid leaks were part of a 
political strategy to boost the president’s ratings before the 2012 presidential election.51 
That may be the case, but the White House and DoD have released the operational details 
of other high-profile Navy SEAL missions as well.52 As a political tactic, this certainly 
sets a dangerous precedent, though Eliot Cohen suggests that behavior like this is typical 
in democracies, and that the actions are meant as signals, both to the domestic population 
and to enemies abroad.53 He writes, “An elite unit offers the public the illusion if not the 
reality of brilliant and sudden military successes. Even when the minutiae of a particular 
escapade are forgotten, the reputation of heroism remains.”54 Roger Beaumont, in his 
study of 20th century elite units, goes further and writes, “[Elite units] serve a publicity 
and propaganda function, and they were also good show business.”55 
Regardless of the political reasons for the release of mission details by the White 
House, the commentary on the conservative side has been just as political and in many 
ways even more damaging. The conservative argument is that the Navy SEALs “deserve 
all the credit.”56 One has to wonder: Is it really a good idea to tout the SEALs as the 
heroes, parade their stories in the media, and give them even more exposure, while at the 
same time expecting them to remain effective in covert and clandestine missions? 
The SEALs exist as an extension of foreign policy, nothing more. They do not 
need public recognition by the government or any political class within the country. 
Arguably, the only thing the world needs to know is that the United States has a 
                                                 
51 Daniel Halper, “Obama Campaign Trots Out Bin Laden, Spikes the Football,” The Weekly 
Standard, April 27, 2012, http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/obama-campaign-trots-out-bin-laden-
spikes-football_642143.html. 
52 A simple Internet search of “SEAL missions” provides plenty of evidence of this. Two fairly recent 
examples are the April 12, 2009 rescue of Captain Richard Phillips from armed pirates off the coast of 
Somalia and the January 24, 2012 rescue of Jessica Buchanan and Poul Thisted in Somalia. In each of these 
recent cases, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and methods were immediately the subject of 
media commentary. 
53 Cohen, Commandos and Politicians, 49. 
54 Cohen, Commandos and Politicians, 50. 
55 Roger Beaumont, Military Elites (New York, NY: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1974), 148. 
56 See the transcript from Fox News “The Five Debates Who Really Gets Credit For Bin Laden 
Death,” May 1, 2012, http://nation.foxnews.com/five/2012/05/01/five-debates-who-really-gets-credit-bin-
laden-death. 
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capability that can travel across borders undetected, break into heavily guarded 
compounds, shoot its enemies in the face, and dump their bodies in the ocean. In my 
view, politicians and the media more generally are making an unfortunate mistake when 
they believe that openly talking about the details of these operations in the press 
somehow honors the men and women that execute these missions. By invoking such 
“patriotic correctness,” these self-avowed supporters of the troops ironically do more 
damage to the SEALs by exposing the nature of their work and undermining their 
strategic utility. But the White House and the media are not the only ones to blame for 
stirring up publicity about the SEALs. 
B. PUBLICITY STUNTS 
Around 2008, NSW leaders decided to endorse the making of the movie Act of 
Valor, which starred active duty Navy SEALs. NSWC’s actions may have been driven by 
the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, which mandated that SOF grow by 15% to 
meet global commitments.57 According to the Navy SEAL + SWCC Scout Team, NSW 
reorganized its recruiting efforts to raise public awareness and meet these new demands. 
During this time, NSW went through a phase when the leadership felt it could boost 
recruiting by taking an “entertainment” approach.58 Initially conceived as a recruiting 
documentary, Act of Valor morphed into a full-blown Hollywood production.59 While not 
exactly a blockbuster, the result was a movie that grossed $83 million worldwide and had 
$43 million in domestic video sales.60 
From a military propaganda and recruiting perspective, there are plenty of 
historical precedents for embarking on such an endeavor. The movie Top Gun is a perfect 
example. The Navy saw an additional 20,000 sailors join following the movie’s release in 
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1986.61 For reasons like this, Act of Valor may have seemed like a good idea at the time. 
But NSW’s willingness to selectively forsake the SEAL Ethos in order to raise awareness 
points to a compromise in values that ultimately undermined the traditional trust 
relationship between the leadership and the men. As Brandon Webb himself commented: 
“Don’t just create an ambiguous rule and try to enforce it when you just completed 
f***ing Act of Valor.”62 In Mr. Webb’s case, as well as that of many other SEALs with 
whom I have spoken, the SEAL Ethos leaves too much to interpretation, and Act of Valor 
only validated certain SEALs’ latent proclivities for self-promotion. 
From where I sit, there are two major problems with NSW’s endorsement of Act 
of Valor. First, from a national security perspective, it was completely anti-functional for 
NSW to have endorsed the making of a Hollywood movie that showcases current tactics 
and active duty Navy SEALs. Even if NSW scrubbed sensitive information, the movie 
can only crystalize in the mind of America’s competitors and adversaries the culture and 
capabilities of America’s maritime special operations force. Second, as mentioned 
previously, the making of the movie sent a confusing message to SEALs, who were left 
to question why NSW could take advantage of the public interest and adulation but 
individual SEALs could not. Former SEALs like Mr. Webb now use Act of Valor to 
rationalize or excuse away their own breaches of the SEAL Ethos. Unfortunately, and at a 
minimum, even if NSW did not consciously set out to compromise its values, it sent 
confusing messages to SEALs throughout the larger active duty and retired communities, 
and in the end only perpetuated the cycle of commercialization that is currently causing 
NSW so much grief. As an aside, the Navy SEAL + SWCC Scout Team conducted 
surveys of new recruits following the release of the movie to gauge market penetration 
and the movie’s impact on recruits’ decision to join the Navy. The results were 
negligible, meaning that there was little to no return on investment for recruiting 
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purposes.63 In the final analysis, it appears the only thing NSW received from Act of 
Valor was the ire of the SEAL community. 
Neither was Act of Valor necessarily the first mixed signal from NSW leadership. 
According to a source within NSW, the point at which the current generation of SEALs 
first saw the lucrative nature of selling their stories was with NSWC’s endorsement of the 
book Lone Survivor, which hit shelves in 2007.64 NSW’s endorsement of Marcus Luttrell 
appears to have sent the initial signal to the SEAL community that writing books about 
current operations was acceptable. With the runaway success of that book, an entire 
generation of SEALs, both past and present, saw a lucrative opportunity to cash in on 
personal stories, and many have fully embraced this new Market Ethos. 
C. MIXED MESSAGES 
So, what kind of messages are the White House and NSWC sending when they 
deliberately expose the Navy SEAL brand to publicity for political use and recruiting? As 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) professor Dayne Nix notes, “The political realities of 
the contemporary security environment require that civilian leaders establish political 
expectations and end states…[but] lack of guidance from political leaders results in 
confusion on the battlefield and the squandering of resources.”65 The government and 
NSWC’s strategic messaging on operational security (OPSEC) and SEAL operations has 
often been schizophrenic, and arguably confusing. Although political realities like these 
should hold little sway over men of high character who are governed by a common ethos, 
the mixed messages from top leadership within NSWC and the White House can only 
confuse the situation. 
There are certainly other drivers behind the SEALs’ foray into the limelight 
beyond operational success, poor messaging by leadership, and weakening organizational 
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values within NSW. Charles Moskos and others have argued that there has been a 
cultural shift in broader society that has introduced “a profound relativism into 
discourse.”66 Is it possible that society’s mores are slowly influencing the military, and 
hence affecting SEALs’ attitudes? These shifting values are the essence of Samuel 
Huntington’s concerns about the two imperatives of civil-military relations: “the 
functional imperative stemming from the threats to the society’s security and the societal 
imperative arising from the social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant within the 
society.”67 New 21st century currents include the “interpenetrability of civilian and 
military spheres,”68 “the dissolution of old categories, the rejection of absolutes…and the 
disappearance of allegiances to units greater than the individual.”69 
Though there is no perfect explanation for why SEALs have decided to make an 
increasingly public spectacle of their SEAL accomplishments, shifting societal mores, the 
lure of fame, and lucrative opportunities have converged to create a host of new tensions 
for which NSW may not have been prepared, and for which the SEAL Ethos has no 
longer proved adequate. 
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V. THE COMMODIFICATION CYCLE AND SOCIAL CAPITAL 
The history of fame, according to cultural historian Leo Braudy, “is also the 
history of the shifting definition of achievement in a social world, achievement often 
defined by the eyes of others.”70 According to Braudy’s formulation, the Navy SEALs 
would appear to have achieved considerable fame in the eyes of American society, 
particularly when one considers their lionization in the last decade.  
A. THE COMMODIFICATION CYCLE 
In the case of NSW, the progression from obscurity to fame has developed in four 
steps. First, publicity through government leaks and media coverage has led to increased 
awareness of the Navy SEALs across American society.71 Second, increased awareness 
has fed increased curiosity and interest in SEAL operations, methods, and capabilities. 
Third, society’s interest and curiosity has invigorated the media and set the conditions for 
a lucrative market in which anything “SEAL” sells. This market is characterized by the 
commodification of the SEAL identity and everything associated with it. Fourth, this new 
market has created opportunities and incentives for those with institutional knowledge of 
the SEAL Teams to profit from that knowledge—even if their association was only 
tangential. This commodification cycle has then perpetuated itself with every new book, 
media appearance, movie, blog post, and publicity stunt. Consequently, while publicity 
was and is the catalyst for NSW’s rise to prominence, fame and money are the corrupters 
and the fuel that keeps the cycle going. 
The most important aspect of this cycle is that without the SEALs’ complicity 
there would be no cycle. Media interest would likely dry up due to lack of reputable 
sources. The film and publishing industries would gain rights to no SEAL stories. The 
blogosphere would be devoid of any SEALs trying to set the record straight. Public 
interest would likely wane, while the mystique would remain—mystique crucial to 
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recruitment and retention in the U.S. and to bolstering SEALs’ image of stealthy, highly 
capable operators abroad. Unfortunately, the reality is quite the opposite as former 
SEALs jockey for media appearances, blog about contemporary SEAL missions, 
publicize their service through autobiographies, leak information to journalists and, for 
all intents and purposes, keep the SEAL name perpetually in the spotlight.  
B. SOCIAL CAPITAL 
These efforts to expose the brand point to problems internal to NSW. The SEAL 
Ethos has fallen prey to the lucrative nature of the cycle that converts fame and publicity 
into authority and legitimacy in the civilian realm. This has happened thanks to the 
intersection of NSW’s unprecedented social capital and the entrepreneurship of former 
SEALs in partnership with outside sponsors. The late sociologist Pierre Bourdieu defined 
social capital as: 
The aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to 
possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized 
relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition—or in other words, 
to membership in a group—which provides each of its members with the 
backing of the collectivity-owned capital, a ‘credential’ which entitles 
them to credit, in the various senses of the word.72 
If we accept Bourdieu’s definition, then all SEALs, past and present, benefit from 
NSW’s accumulated credit and prestige. The volume of the social capital possessed by 
each individual SEAL “depends on the size of the network of connections he can 
effectively mobilize and on the volume of the capital (economic, cultural or symbolic) 
possessed in his own right by each of those to whom he is connected.”73 Put 
simplistically:  
 
Social capital = symbolic capital (NSW) + [(economic capital) x (size of network)] 
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Over the past decade, NSW’s symbolic capital has grown significantly and hence 
so has its social capital. Until recently, the quiet professional ethic helped delimit these 
boundaries. NSWC controlled the size of the network and the exchanges that granted 
access to its symbolic capital. The NSW commander determined which official 
relationships to sponsor, and the SEAL Ethos (at least theoretically) ensured SEALs were 
not making relationships independent of the command that would expose NSW or lend 
its credibility to non-sanctioned entities. In this way, NSW and its most important 
resource, its people, worked together to protect their collectively owned capital, and all of 
this rested on implied mutual trust.  
As Bourdieu argues when talking about the kinds of societies anthropologists 
typically study: 
Each member of the group is thus instituted as a custodian of the limits of 
the group: because the definition of the criteria of entry is at stake in each 
new entry…It is quite logical that, in most societies, the preparation and 
conclusion of marriages should be the business of the whole group, and 
not of the agents directly concerned. Through the introduction of new 
members into a family, a clan, or a club, the whole definition of the group, 
i.e., its fines, its boundaries, and its identity, is put at stake, exposed to 
redefinition, alteration, adulteration.74 
Given the criteria Bourdieu describes, any access to NSW’s symbolic capital 
should remain centrally controlled, and of benefit to the whole group if the group is to 
thrive (or even survive). Sanctioned efforts lead to the institutional relationships that 
support NSW’s role and effectiveness, to include the trust that leads to funding, 
authorities, and missions. But, as discussed, even sanctioned efforts can lead to problems 
if they introduce corrupting influences into the group. Any relationships that leverage 
NSW’s symbolic capital for the benefit of anything other than the collective run the risk 
of fundamentally altering the nature of the organization. The following (Figure 2) depicts 
how NSW, former SEALs, and outside actors all work to access NSW’s shared symbolic 
capital. 
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As the figure shows, NSW shares its symbolic capital with all SEALs, past and 
present. In order for outside actors to legitimately tap into NSW’s symbolic capital, they 
must either go through officially controlled NSW channels, or through former SEALs 
who have shown a willingness to market their SEAL identities. Ostensibly, for many 
outside actors, this uncontrolled channel offers the path of least resistance and the 
greatest payoff. Applying Bourdieu’s logic, one could argue that NSW’s culture has been 
corrupted because of a growth in these relationships with various outside actors. This is 
true of both NSW’s sanctioned efforts, such as supporting Act of Valor, and former 
SEALs’ unsanctioned efforts that hijack NSW’s symbolic capital and bring unwanted 
exposure to the brand through outside sponsors. 
Preventing misuse of NSW’s symbolic capital is the basis of the trust relationship 
among members, but particularly between the leadership and the men. One could argue 
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that this trust relationship in NSW has weakened significantly. Otherwise, presumably, 
SEALs would not have leveraged NSW’s symbolic capital to the extent they have to 
create personally profitable relationships beyond NSW’s purview. As mentioned, one 
thing that has made this possible is the use of financial incentives and economic capital 
by outsiders. The transaction that occurs is SEALs’ trading of their symbolic capital for 
others’ economic capital. Again, Bourdieu explains what happens as the group-based 
ethos gives way to a market ethos: 
[For] those who, like the professionals, live on the sale of cultural services 
to a clientele, the accumulation of economic capital merges with the 
accumulation of symbolic capital, that is, with the acquisition of a 
reputation for competence and an image of respectability and honorability 
that are easily converted into political positions as a local or national 
notable.75 
In the case of NSW, SEALs bring their competence, respectability, and stature to 
the deal, and the sponsors, who want a piece of the SEAL “magic,” bring the cash, the 
influence, and the network of outside relationships. SEALs then gain a position as the 
front men for any number of undertakings, from marketing SEAL knowhow, to lending 
themselves to politicians, to becoming political actors in their own right. In this way, the 
opening of new venues exposes the SEAL brand in new ways, and NSW’s credibility 
becomes increasingly vulnerable to partisan or corporate sponsors’ agendas.  
Essentially, by collecting SEALs, sponsors come into possession of an inherited 
symbolic capital. This is the conversion process of turning fame and publicity, based on 
the SEAL name (or brand), into authority and legitimacy, and NSW ends up with no 
control over how its own capital is spent. 
As the individual in command of Naval Special Warfare today, Rear Admiral 
Losey acts in a role akin to that described by Bourdieu as the pater familias, or head of 
the family. In that role, Rear Admiral Losey’s responsibility is to “[limit] the 
consequences of individual lapses by explicitly delimiting responsibilities…and shielding 
the group as a whole from discredit by expelling or excommunicating the embarrassing 
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individuals.”76 Basically, one of Rear Admiral Losey’s responsibilities is to protect the 
symbolic and social capital that the SEAL community has earned, and to ensure that it is 
not misused. However, his control does not extend beyond active duty SEALs and the 
relationships NSW sanctions. Control thus becomes a difficult and potentially delicate 
undertaking. Once SEALs leave active service, there is nothing that legally binds them to 
the SEAL Ethos. The current spate of self-aggrandizement is proof of that.  
So, we should wonder, who actually owns NSW’s symbolic capital?  Are there 
ways in which NSW can exert greater authority over the management of its trademark 
symbology to protect it from embezzlement by self-serving individuals and groups? What 
are the implications when an organization of NSW’s stature does not control its own 
narrative or symbolic capital? What are the consequences for a critical special operations 
organization when it can no longer count on maintaining its operational ambiguity vis-à-
vis the enemy? 
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VI. CONSEQUENCES OF PROMOTING SEALS  
FOR ENTERTAINMENT, PROFITS, AND POLITICS— 
WHY WORRY? 
A. UNDUE PROMINENCE AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
One of the few individuals to look at elite military units from a civil-military 
relations and policy perspective was Eliot Cohen in Commandos and Politicians: Elite 
Military Units in Modern Democracies. Many of Cohen’s concerns about the costs and 
consequences of elite units as a matter of military efficiency—such as SOF draining off 
high-quality manpower, fostering inappropriate tactics, and demoralizing other forces—
were addressed as a consequence of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense 
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the follow on Nunn-Cohen Amendment to the National 
Defense Authorization Act of 1987. The formation of United States Special Operations 
Command (USSOCOM) created institutional stability for special operations. But Cohen’s 
reservations about the temptation to overly promote elite units for political purposes seem 
eerily prescient, especially when viewed against the backdrop of the U.S. Navy SEALs in 
2015. His observations also offer a springboard for updating his analysis.  
Cohen lists the following potential consequences of promoting elite units for 
political or romantic reasons. Notice that Cohen is not talking about promoting elite units 
for military/functional purposes, but rather for political-societal/non-functional 
purposes.77 
 When politicians support elite military units for political or romantic 
reasons, these units run the risk of achieving “undue prominence.”78 
 These units provide “temptingly colorful television footage or newspaper 
columns” in the short run. But, thereafter, “the expansion and publicity 
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associated with prominence undermine military efficiency and civil-
military relations.”79  
 The government may initiate efforts to promote elite units as a popular 
symbol for political purposes, but in the end will find it hard to control or 
rein the publicity back in.80 
 Continued media reporting, public interest, and efforts by members of 
these elite units to seek publicity on their own terms only perpetuate the 
problem.81 
Cohen’s analysis from nearly forty years ago reads like a timeline for the SEALs’ 
rise to prominence in contemporary American culture. The government’s use of SEAL 
operations for political leverage with the voters—a short run win—created a publicity 
machine that has granted undue prominence to the SEALs. The spectacular 
commercialization of the SEALs manifested through media reporting, Hollywood 
movies, TV shows, documentaries, books, political commentaries, and blog posts is the 
result of cultivating undue prominence. In essence, society has granted SEALs 
suprarational credibility based primarily off of a handful of highly romanticized and 
politicized military missions.  
President Obama and his policies are, in many ways, responsible for these trends 
and the SEALs’ current credibility. He approved the missions, gave the missions to the 
SEALs, and promoted their success in public forums, thereby turning SEALs into instant 
celebrities. It is then quite ironic that SEALs are transforming that credibility into a 
platform from which to attack the president and his policies. Such are the vagaries of 
fame. 
By romanticizing and publicizing SEAL missions, the government fostered an 
insatiable curiosity that has driven a lucrative new market for SEAL information. Many 
former SEALs have seen the opportunity to capitalize on this lucrative market. In doing 
so, they perpetuate the cycle of commodification through profit-based activities 
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(infotainment, entertainment, politics) that ultimately lead to even more unsanctioned and 
out-of-control publicity (Figure 3).  
Figure 3.  Government-Fostered Fame 
 
 
Former SEAL Robert O’Neill is an important example in this regard, having 
recently made a public spectacle of his participation in the bin Laden raid. He has been 
under investigation by DoD for possibly violating his non-disclosure agreements.82 
However, that fact seems to make little difference to the American public; Mr. O’Neill is 
not only now a Fox News contributor, but several lawmakers have submitted letters on 
his behalf requesting that DoD not pursue charges.83 Lawmakers apparently reason that 
Mr. O’Neill only provided details that were already in the press, and his admissions have 
not endangered national security.84 
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Nevertheless, there are three problems with this logic. First, Executive Order 
13526 Section 1.1 (c) states, “Classified information shall not be declassified 
automatically as a result of any unauthorized disclosure of identical or similar 
information.”85 In other words, while the White House or other SEALs may have 
released information, that does not change the fact that the information is still classified. 
Mr. O’Neill is still legally bound to uphold his federal non-disclosure agreements. 
Second, some operations that SEALs take part in are not NSW or even DoD led 
operations in terms of authorities. Operation Neptune Spear—the bin Laden raid—was 
just such an operation, the details of which were not NSW’s to release to the press in the 
first place, much less did its success belong to any one individual who took part in it. 
Third, the arguments made in favor of Mr. O’Neill point to a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the military’s functional imperative and the Navy SEAL Ethos. The 
logic used by Sean Hannity during an interview with Mr. O’Neill is indicative of the 
problem. Hannity, in defense of O’Neill’s actions, emphatically states, “Every President 
when he gets out of office writes a book, every Vice President, every Secretary of 
Defense, every CIA director.”86 There are two problems with this line of thinking. First, 
NSW’s standards must be above the average politician’s standards, even the commander-
in-chief’s. This is the essence of the SEAL Ethos. Second, Hannity’s logic is reminiscent 
of the Kelly Flinn affair, when the American public broadly questioned the military’s 
policies on adultery, and lawmakers attempted to pressure DoD to change what it 
perceived to be DoD’s antiquated rules.87 What lawmakers and members of society 
misunderstood then, and apparently misunderstand now, is that such rules serve as the 
foundation of a distinctly military ethos. These rules are about good order and discipline. 
They are not only legal, but are also functionally necessary, in that they support the  
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military’s warfighting role. And warfighting, as James Burk contends, “still determines 
the central beliefs, values and complex symbolic formations that define military 
culture.”88  
We might ask: Is ensuring operational security through non-disclosure agreements 
antiquated? Should every military member with a security clearance be encouraged to 
make a public statement or write a book? Surely answering “yes” would lead to the 
complete undermining of operational security. As for the legality of the government 
releasing information: to be sure, the White House has every right to promote the success 
of certain missions, and even to take credit for them. Executive Order 13526 clearly gives 
original classification authority to the President of the United States (POTUS).89 The 
president has the legal authority to determine what should and should not be classified, 
although it is also the Pentagon’s responsibility to ensure POTUS fully understands the 
implications when releasing military details to the press. This dialogue that exists 
between our nation’s elected leaders and the men and women charged with the 
management of violence on the nation’s behalf represents the essence of civil-military 
relations.  
By questioning DoD’s efforts to prosecute O’Neill, lawmakers and others who 
self-identify as supporters of the troops challenge the authority of the imperatives that 
govern military personnel under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. This sets a 
dangerous precedent for future cases. Does Mr. O’Neill’s status as a former SEAL 
provide him with special clemency not available to the common citizen or solider? If so, 
it shows the special, and thereby extremely problematic, clout behind the SEAL brand. It 
would appear that a halo around the U.S. Navy SEALs may be clouding people’s 
judgment. As a result, NSW is now caught in the middle of a civil-military relations 
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struggle that pits the societal imperative of promoting heroics against the functional 
imperative of adhering to a distinctly military ethos of duty and professionalism. 
B. NATIONAL SECURITY 
From a purely functional perspective, releasing the operational details of SEAL 
missions can rarely enhance national security—unless of course, the information is part 
of a deliberate deception scheme aimed at taking advantage of an adversary’s cognitive 
biases, such as was the practice in World War II. But, as Walter Jajko noted with regard 
to deception today, “One is led to conclude that the United States seems to lack an 
intellectual, ethical, and institutional framework for understanding and undertaking 
deception operations systematically on any significant scale against its adversaries.”90 
Therefore, if intentional leaks are not designed to deceive, then no functional military 
purpose is served by disclosing detailed operational information to the public, and 
especially not while special operations forces remain employed around the globe. 
Keeping such information proprietary has been considered key to maintaining a 
comparative advantage over the enemy. Information about the capabilities, composition, 
tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods of special operations units is of potential use 
to an adversary; a concept engrained in military thinking from Sun Tzu to Clausewitz.  
Surprise in battle comes from knowing enemy tactics and doctrine. This is why 
militaries around the world study threats and technologies: to better understand the 
enemy. The goal is to create information asymmetry or, rather, to achieve “information 
dominance.” Professor John Arquilla defines information dominance as “Knowing 
everything about an adversary while keeping the adversary from knowing much about 
oneself.”91 It stands to reason, then, that any information that undermines the operational 
security of the SEALs and limits their ability to surprise the enemy increases their 
chances of failure and puts American lives at risk.  
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When SEALs lose their operational ambiguity, they simultaneously lose two 
critical components related to the established “principles of war” and the “principles of 
special operations”: namely, security and surprise.92 Accepting this, it then naturally 
follows that government leaks, in-depth documentaries, realistic video games, media 
reports, blogs, and tell-all books that discuss contemporary SEAL missions have the 
potential to undermine the SEALs’ military effectiveness and, hence, national security. It 
also follows that if raising the SEALs’ visibility endangers national security, every effort 
should be made to protect and preserve the operational ambiguity of the SEAL Teams. 
On August 6, 2011, Taliban fighters shot down a CH-47 helicopter loaded with 
special operations personnel, half of whom were SEALs from Naval Special Warfare 
Development Group (NSWDG). The crash killed everyone onboard. This event is widely 
known as “Extortion 17,” which was the call sign of the helicopter. Many of the families 
of the men killed believe that President Obama’s administration is to blame for the crash. 
They claim that revelations provided by the administration about the SEALs’ role in the 
bin Laden raid gave the Taliban the details necessary to target the SEALs in 
Afghanistan.93 Critics can, and should, counter that there is no credible evidence that 
these allegations are correct. But, as described earlier, the White House released many of 
the details of the bin Laden raid to the press almost immediately after the Abbottabad 
mission, and according to documents released through the Freedom of Information Act, 
the White House now acknowledges that information it gave to the filmmakers of Zero 
Dark Thirty could have posed an “unnecessary security and counterintelligence risk” if 
made public.94 How would the administration answer the charge that its efforts to 
promote the SEALs for political points actually led to a catastrophic loss of American 
life? 
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Such a scenario is not outside the realm of the possible. Unforeseen dangers 
always attend the release of operational details about contemporary special operations 
missions.  
A common misunderstanding about OPSEC is that it only relates to classified 
information. The U.S. Department of Defense Education Activity (DoDEA) defines 
OPSEC as “the process by which we protect UNCLASSIFIED information that can be 
used against us. OPSEC challenges us to look at ourselves through the eyes of an 
adversary (individuals, groups, countries, organizations).”95 According to DoDEA, 90% 
of the information collected by America’s adversaries comes from “open sources.” Open 
sources include books, media broadcasts, social media accounts (e.g., Twitter feeds, 
Facebook), newspapers, government reports, blogs, and academic papers. That statistic—
90%—should shock people. How can anyone argue that government leaks, books, video 
games, NSW-endorsed movies, and detailed media commentaries about SEALs do not 
put America’s national security at risk? The purveyors of information about SEALs need 
to ask themselves how comfortable they feel sending their products directly to a terrorist 
group, and how comfortable they feel about sharing TTPs with future adversaries. 
Al-Qa’ida (AQ) has consistently shown its willingness to gather open-source 
information, going so far as to cull Government Accounting Office (GAO) reports.96 AQ 
is also known to have translated U.S. military training manuals into Arabic.97 The U.S. 
must assume that the likes of AQ and Daesh pay attention to reporting, especially any and 
all reporting on the unit that successfully killed Osama bin Laden. We should hope that 
they do not pick up on sensitive details and that OPSEC violations go unnoticed. 
However, the dangers multiply when sensitive details are repeated on national news until 
every last cable subscriber hears about them. This is exactly what has happened with 
several of the SEALs’ operations. Worth noting is the same logic applies across the full 
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spectrum of media exposure, while every book that a SEAL writes about current 
operations does untold damage; every play-by-play walkthrough in the press helps 
complete the mosaic of how SEALs operate. If war is rational, as Michael I. Handel 
claims, then “there is never a reason to make life easier for the adversary or more difficult 
for oneself.”98 But even if war is irrational, as it so often is, the same logic still applies. 
Cultivating a public persona around one’s SEAL identity also puts families and 
communities at unnecessary risk, especially in the era of social media when so many 
people are connected. Now-deceased former SEAL Chris Kyle is an example of the 
dangers inherent in cultivating a public persona when one is a special operations 
practitioner. The national attention that Mr. Kyle attracted from his book, America 
Sniper: The Autobiography of the Most Lethal Sniper in U.S. Military History, may very 
well have contributed to his and his friend’s death at the hands of a disturbed military 
veteran. The tragic irony of his death is most evident in one answer to why he decided to 
write the book in the first place. 
I wanted to be able to get it out about not the sacrifices that the military 
members make, but the sacrifices that their families have to go through 
about the single mothers now raising their children and doing all the day-
to-day house chores.99  
Chris Kyle’s wife is now a single mother raising their two children on her own. 
What’s more, former SEAL Jesse Ventura successfully sued the Kyle estate because of 
public statements Chris Kyle made disparaging Mr. Ventura’s reputation, causing added 
duress to the Kyle family.100 Again, this is a result of Chris Kyle creating a commodified 
and public persona around his SEAL identity, something that could have been avoided.  
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Robert O’Neill provides another example: How must Mr. O’Neill’s neighbors 
have felt when a Daesh sympathizer released O’Neill’s home address and called for 
Islamic extremists to execute him?101 How many people has Mr. O’Neill put at risk in his 
quest for the spotlight?  
C. ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS 
From an organizational perspective, the SEALs’ rise to prominence has come 
with both positive and negative implications. According to the Navy SEAL + SWCC 
Scout Team, the SEALs’ popularity has almost entirely eliminated the need for NSW to 
raise awareness for SEAL recruiting efforts, which has allowed NSW’s recruiting 
directorate to focus on the other two pillars of its program, Information and 
Assistance.102 For the first time in years, NSW has been able to completely fill its Basic 
Underwater Demolition/SEAL (BUD/S) classes. NSW also enjoys unprecedented support 
from the American people. There are currently 40 charitable organizations partnered with 
NSW, raising a significant amount of money each year for SEALs and their families.103 
SEALs are better trained and better funded than before, and have proven themselves in 
combat time and again over the last fifteen years. From this perspective, publicity has 
been a boon for NSW. However, there are insidious downsides to this fame as well. 
The greatest danger for NSW may lie in the erosion of trust and credibility with 
other military units, interagency partners, and civilian leaders. It does not look good for 
NSW when SEALs are writing the majority of the tell-all books on the market. Since 
9/11, NSW has worked hard to establish relationships with other SOF units. But, when 
SEALs consistently jockey for the spotlight, it can only put strains on relations grounded 
in mutual trust among quiet professionals. Trust and reputation are everything in the 
special operations community; without it there can be no credibility. The question that the 
current USSOCOM commander may be asking himself is, “Why should I send NSW on 
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this mission if there is a good chance one of their guys will write a book about it?” This is 
a valid question, and nobody should fault General Votel, who is not a SEAL, for asking 
it. This is especially the case in the wake of the release of Sean Naylor’s new book, 
Relentless Strike: The Secret History of Joint Special Operations Command. According 
to Naylor, several of his sources for the book were NSWDG operators that spoke 
candidly about Joint Special Operation Command (JSOC) operations.104 Granted, he had 
other sources as well, but the fact that he had SEAL sources is what garnered the most 
press. 
From a non-SEAL SOF perspective, SEALs are not only writing more books than 
ever, but are now actively talking to the press about national missions. If the USSOCOM 
commander loses faith in SEALs’ ability to keep quiet it would pose an existential threat 
for NSW. This is especially true if it results in NSW losing missions to other SOF units, 
or if it means NSW loses access and placement and freedom of maneuver with our 
interagency partners in Washington, DC, and around the world.  
This new environment also has the potential to seriously strain NSW’s 
relationships with the executive branch, especially as former SEALs engage in political 
attacks against POTUS. When SEALs publicly choose sides in a political contest, they 
alienate themselves from and turn their backs on members of the party they oppose. 
NSW’s credibility is eroded when SEALs appear in media broadcasts wearing Trident 
pins while engaging in partisan discussions. Regardless of how a former SEAL feels 
about his commander-in-chief, he must recognize that his actions will affect the 
relationship between his teammates, as successors who continue to serve, and the man 
who assigns the missions. Do these former SEALs want POTUS to ask: Why not send in 
Army special operations? Most likely, the answer is “no.” 
Even internal to the NSW organization, fame has had a corrupting influence. In 
the last ten years, the number of disciplinary actions taken against active duty SEALs 
who have sought to profit from commercializing NSW information has markedly 
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increased.105 NSW is currently dealing with multiple Ethos violations by active duty 
SEALs who are moonlighting and engaging in unsanctioned side projects outside the 
Navy. Even the relationships created between SEALs and wealthy donors at NSW charity 
events have proven to be ground zero for subsequent Ethos violations.106 The temptations 
that come with fame and interest place NSW on the horns of a dilemma, as it must walk a 
fine line between securing public funding and support for SEALs and their families on 
the one hand, and guarding them from the lure of outside money on the other hand. Even 
sponsors with pure intentions, who are simply trying to give back, can put NSW and its 
people at risk by creating a venue for the publicity-commodification cycle to take off. 
My intent here is not to suggest that these consequences represent the end of the 
world for NSW. But, I would argue that we will see increasingly negative consequences 
in the future if current trends continue. America seems to have a need to celebrate its 
special operations practitioners through media exposure, charitable giving, and for-profit 
opportunities. This is laudable—but only up to a point. The reality is that the adulation, 
glorification, and lionization of the Navy SEALs by the government and society writ 
large have had a corrupting effect. The consequences of that corruption are evident in the 
actions undertaken by SEALs to personally profit from and capitalize on being SEALs, 
thereby trafficking in unsanctioned publicity about NSW. This celebrity SEAL 
environment poses threats not only to our men and women in uniform, but to national 
security more broadly, and to the quality of civil-military relations in America. 
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VII. COUNTERARGUMENTS 
I have argued that when SOF practitioners, the government, and society writ large 
cultivate the prominence of SEALs for monetary or ideological gain they corrupt the 
SEAL culture by incentivizing narcissistic and profit-focused behavior. This, in turn, 
erodes military effectiveness, damages national security, and undermines healthy civil-
military relations. Others might contend that this is not true, that the benefits that come 
from publicizing SEAL exploits in the press outweigh any negative ramifications, and 
that the exposure is not that big a deal. I will address three of the most common 
counterarguments I encountered when conducting my research. 
A. DETERRENCE 
According to those who cite publicity’s value for deterrence purposes, the United 
States government should publicize special operations missions in the press because this 
sends a strong signal to our enemies to not mess with America. Basically, describing and 
discussing SEAL operations will deter America’s current and potential adversaries. 
According to this line of thinking, North Korea, Russia, China, Iran, Daesh, and Al-
Qa’ida will think twice about opposing the United States because of the incredible 
capabilities, characteristics, tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods of the U.S. 
Navy SEALs, which deliberately have been made public. 
However, for this to hold, the fear of the Navy SEALs would have to outweigh 
the politics and the ideologies of state and non-state actors alike. This is unlikely. What is 
more likely is that these entities will adapt and adjust their tactics based on what they see, 
hear, and can access via open sources. There is already evidence that our adversaries 
change their tactics following disclosures about U.S. surveillance practices.107 
Furthermore, data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) points to a worldwide rise 
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in terrorism activity and intensity, especially since 2011.108 This suggests that enemies of 
the U.S. are not being deterred at all by the efforts of American special operations. Also, 
the fact that Daesh published Robert O’Neill’s home address suggests that Islamic 
extremists, at least, are not scared of the Navy SEALs. If anything, the detailed 
commentary about SEAL operations helps prepare them for when the SEALs come 
knocking on their doors.  
B. OVERSIGHT AND THE RIGHT TO KNOW 
A different argument involves the need for transparency. Many believe that SOF 
units, like the SEALs, not only need government oversight, but that Americans have a 
right to know what SEALs are doing and how they do it. Some fear the development of 
praetorianism. In the balance between national security and transparency, many would 
rather see more transparency.  
Critics and skeptics are not wrong: Congressional oversight of special operations 
is not only healthy, but absolutely necessary. America’s elected leaders have a 
responsibility to understand how SOF is employed in pursuit of national security 
objectives. There is a difference, however, between elected leaders who hold the highest 
security clearances being told the details about these missions and what the average 
American citizen, or even reporter for that matter, needs to know. Without operational 
security, protection of methods and sources is impossible. The problem with the oversight 
argument is that it assumes the United States operates in a vacuum, and that all of 
America’s business should be done in the open, even though every other nation state on 
planet Earth operates exactly opposite. At the same time, this argument cannot simply be 
brushed aside since it goes to the heart of civil-military relations, which rests on a 
foundation of mutual trust. The American people must trust that the SEALs are only 
doing what they are told to do, and that they are being told to do it only by the officials 
the citizenry elected into office to act on its behalf. 
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C. THIS IS ONLY A PASSING PHASE 
A stoic might contend that what we are seeing with the SEALs today is merely 
the equivalent of a shiny nickel. Society will tire of SEAL stories and move on to the next 
big thing. Recall the U.S. Army Green Berets during Vietnam. The Green Berets went 
through a similar phase, breaking into pop culture with a major motion picture and even a 
No. 1 hit song, “The Ballad of the Green Berets.” For those who believe the Navy SEALs 
are simply victims of their own success and that their time will likewise pass, patience is 
the most important virtue.  
However, while this is the counterargument that I hope does come true, in order 
for the SEALs to slip back into the shadows, the government and the SEALs themselves 
need to stop cultivating publicity. This assumes, too, that there will be no more Osama 
bin Ladens who need killing or Captain Phillipses who need rescuing. It assumes that the 
publicity problem will also take care of itself.  
Unfortunately, this type of “wait-and-see” logic is what allowed the SEALs to 
reach the level of undue prominence that they have. Also, unlike the Green Berets of the 
1960s, special operations forces today are employed on a much greater scale around the 
world conducting overt, covert, and clandestine operations. It will take deliberate efforts 
by all parties to break the lucrative cycle of commercialization that feeds the market for 
the “authentic, accurate, and timely analysis of Special Operations” that knowledge of 
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VIII. WHAT TO DO? 
Every problem highlighted in this paper finds its origin in a violation of NSW’s 
quiet professional ethic. Even in the face of externally generated publicity, self-serving 
politicians, and lucrative moneymaking opportunities, the SEAL Ethos should suffice to 
ensure that SEALs only engage in responsible and sanctioned behavior. Therefore, 
restoring the ethic within the SEAL Teams must be NSW’s number one priority. A 
second, but equally important task must be to sensitize the American public to what is 
and is not acceptable to talk about. Third is to recapture the narrative from a subculture of 
publicity-seeking SEALs who are eroding NSW’s credibility, putting SEALs’ lives at 
risk, confusing the American public, incentivizing violations of the SEAL Ethos, and 
generally undermining civil-military relations. The fourth task falls to all Navy SEALs 
who need to actively oppose the commodification of the SEAL brand through peer 
pressure and by discrediting abusers of NSW’s symbolic capital. Altogether, these 
recommendations can be thought of as the internal approach, the external approach, and 
the grassroots approach. 
A. INTERNAL APPROACH 
NSW must reinforce weakened cultural assumptions in the SEAL community. 
According to Vijay Sathe, “The individual becomes fundamentally committed to the 
organization’s beliefs and values when he or she internalizes them, that is, when the 
person comes to hold them as personal beliefs and values.”109 Consequently, in order for 
the SEAL Ethos to govern behavior once a SEAL leaves active duty service, SEALs must 
truly internalize NSW’s beliefs and values. Sathe says, “It is through the process of 
internalization by individual members of an organization that the assumptions become 
shared assumptions.”110 Somehow over the course of the past decade these cultural 
assumptions significantly weakened. Why? Sathe argues that: 
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By focusing on stressful periods in history, particularly those that were 
traumatic for the organization, one also has the opportunity to discover the 
ordering of the cultural assumptions. Order is hard to decipher during 
normal periods because assumptions may not ordinarily conflict with each 
other. However, during a stressful period, the organization may be forced 
to choose between two important assumptions.111 
We can point to the convergence of publicity, fame, and the pressure to boost 
recruiting, as having had just such a “traumatic” impact on NSW, one that proved 
stronger than the SEAL Ethos. This, in turn, reveals the weakness in NSW’s cultural 
assumptions. Sathe argues that an important aspect of a cultural pattern is the “relative 
ordering of its basic assumptions.”112 These assumptions guide which values, principles, 
or beliefs will prevail during a time of tension; otherwise they will come into conflict 
with each other. Borrowing from Sathe, we can say that the normative and functional 
military ethic of quiet professionalism was challenged by societal assumptions about just 
rewards, and that given a rise in narcissism and self-centeredness overall, the SEAL 
Ethos failed to guide behavior at a critical time during NSW’s history. NSW’s leadership 
team failed to realize this and, indeed, fell into the same trap. Therefore, as a first step, 
NSW should apologize to the SEAL community for Act of Valor. As one SEAL 
expressed to me, “Until we can officially acknowledge our mistakes and have the 
leadership apologize to the community, we will never be able to hold others’ feet to the 
fire for Ethos violations.”113 Acknowledgement by the NSW leadership that Act of Valor 
was not in line with NSW’s Ethos about self-promotion and publicity would go far in 
signaling to all SEALs that the time has come to rebuild not only the quiet professional 
ethic, but also the trust between the leadership and the men. 
Even without such an acknowledgment, NSW has already initiated numerous 
internal efforts to resurrect quiet professionalism in the wake of this overexposure. Rear 
Admiral Losey, in his role as NSWC commander, has introduced several of what Edgar 
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Schein calls “primary embedding mechanisms” in order to reinstitutionalize the SEAL 
Ethos: 
 What leaders pay attention to, measure, and control 
 How leaders react to critical incidents and organizational crises 
 Deliberate role modeling and coaching  
 Operational criteria for the allocation of rewards and status 
 Operational criteria for recruitment, selection, promotion, retirement, and 
excommunication114  
As evidenced by his letter to the NSW community, Rear Admiral Losey is paying 
attention to the issue of Ethos violations, and he has undertaken efforts to assess and 
control the embezzlement of NSW’s symbolic capital within the organization. He has 
initiated an education campaign about the SEAL Ethos, and his staff has updated the 
policy on outside employment activities by NSW personnel. SEALs are now provided 
with a Standards of Conduct card to reference in ambiguous situations. In short, the 
leadership has stepped up enforcement of the SEAL Ethos to set the example, and to 
begin to roll back the culture of permissiveness fostered by previous leadership.  
Finally, and perhaps most critically, NSW recently introduced a Continuum of 
Leadership Development (CLD) program. The aim of this program is to overcome two 
pitfalls that have historically caused problems within the SEAL/SWCC training pipeline: 
deselecting/dropping good candidates and selecting/qualifying bad candidates. CLD 
focuses on selecting men based on character and competence rather than physical 
performance alone.115 This is the crux of the problem with individuals like Robert 
O’Neill, Matthew Bissonnette, Brandon Webb, and others.116 They may have been very 
successful practitioners, but they categorically failed when faced with the tough decision 
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of defending the SEAL Ethos. The goal of CLD will be to ensure that individuals prone 
to putting themselves first (for whatever reason) never make it through training.  
Central to the success of the internal approach will be the leadership from the 
officers and chiefs at the lowest (and most critical) level of NSW’s structure—the SEAL 
platoon. NSW’s leaders must set the example for their people, and assist the commander 
in institutionalizing the SEAL Ethos. The example that NSW’s chiefs and junior officers 
set will lay the foundation for the next generation of SEALs. It all starts with the SEAL 
platoon. 
But not even these internal fixes will be sufficient unless NSW develops an 
equally aggressive approach to managing the growing counterculture outside of the active 
duty Navy.  
B. EXTERNAL APPROACH 
No other corporation in the world would allow a group of external actors to so 
significantly drive its corporate narrative. In the civilian sector, corporations jealously 
guard their trade secrets and their corporate images. They employ teams of lawyers, 
public relations personnel, and marketing specialists to ensure that the message supports 
the bottom line and the corporation’s values. Their non-disclosure agreements actually 
act as effective deterrents because corporations will spend the money to enforce them. 
NSW and USSOCOM must adopt the same approach.  
The special operations ecosystem has evolved to the point where adopting a 
bunker mentality of not engaging with the outside world in the face of transgressions of 
the SEAL Ethos only helps to undermine the official narrative. Essentially, by doing 
nothing, NSW gives deviant SEALs and a hyper-interested media free reign to say or do 
whatever they want. Right now, NSW is not in control of its own symbolic capital or its 
own narrative. Right now, the American public learns about what SEALs think from 
books, Fox News, SOFREP.com, and SEAL-led public speaking engagements, because 
these are the outlets where publicity-seeking “deviant” SEALs have found a voice. 
NSW’s silence in the face of this publicity seeking only reinforces the behavior, and 
sends a message to active duty SEALs that NSW will not defend its image. One takeaway 
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for those of us within the community is that NSW must challenge these men and their 
messages, or we will find that outsiders will continue to drive the narrative.  
NSW today cannot afford to ignore former SEALs any more than it can ignore 
what SEALs on active duty do and say. Both affect NSW’s efficiency and image. NSW’s 
seemingly passive approach turns out to be ill-adapted to the media-saturated 
environment in which we live today. 
Consequently, NSW should consider two approaches to managing the effects of 
unsought fame. First, it should grow its public affairs arm into a more robust entity that 
“actively” protects the NSW narrative. This means assigning the current public affairs 
officer (PAO) a larger staff to handle NSW’s image full time. NSW should also create a 
position in the public affairs office for a high-ranking SEAL who would work side-by-
side with the PAO on NSW-related press for the commander of NSWC. Currently, there 
is no SEAL working in NSW’s public affairs arm, and the office appears to function in 
more of a passive role, responding to inquiries, but not actively defending NSW from the 
SEAL infotainment insurgency. Much like the White House press secretary, NSW’s PAO 
or press secretary should have the authority to officially respond to any and all SEAL- 
related reporting. Major news networks would then have a point of contact and an official 
representative willing to appear on camera to comment on NSW-related news. Although 
it might seem counterintuitive for me to suggest this after describing the dangers of 
overexposure, the difference is that NSW would be driving the discussion, and the 
networks would have a reliable source to turn to rather than having to elicit from a 
SEAL-for-hire with an agenda who does not speak for the SEAL community. 
Ideally, no information about sensitive missions should be released. But, if a leak 
does occur, and the information is going to get reported anyway, why not allow NSW to 
control the narrative? NSW would control the release of the information to ensure 
Americans were informed. But, at the same time, NSW would be in a position to only 
release non-sensitive details. This would not only ensure the credibility of what the news 
networks report, but would enable NSW to quickly correct false narratives and deviant 
messaging while ensuring some semblance of operational security. 
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Also, with an active press secretary and press office, if a news network decided to 
bring on a former SEAL to criticize the president or his policies based on false or flawed 
claims, NSW would be able to immediately discredit that individual’s comments. In some 
cases, the press secretary might need to publicly shame the network for using the SEAL 
brand to push a partisan political agenda. This is something that is missing from the 
current dialogue between NSW and the media. For instance, when Fox News hired 
Robert O’Neill as a contributor, NSW and USSOCOM should have conducted an all-out 
public relations campaign, and used every connection in the Pentagon and in Washington, 
DC, to get Fox News to desist. Unfortunately, Fox News today owns the “man who killed 
Osama bin Laden,” and the only thing the SOF community can do is lick its wounds 
while O’Neill profits.  
Whether SEALs like it or not, NSW is now famous. That means the status quo 
has changed, and NSW must change along with it. A more active public relations 
approach by NSW would be a critical first step. Bottom line; NSW needs to be more 
aggressive with its press engagement strategy, and adopt a proactive stance focused on 
building closer relations with the media. NSW must actively push official narratives; 
discredit deviants, and protect NSW’s symbolic capital from embezzlement. Not only 
must NSW jealously defend its narrative, but it must also educate the American people 
about who to listen to when it comes to Naval Special Warfare. As Walter Lippman 
famously said, “Public opinion is always wrong, much too intransigent in war, much too 
yielding in peace, insufficiently informed, lacking the specialized knowledge upon which 
lucid judgments can be based.”117 NSW should endeavor to change this. 
Secondly, NSW should consider establishing a permanent ethics board chaired by 
an active duty high ranking SEAL officer, and comprised of retired SEALs and a team of 
lawyers dedicated to protecting NSW’s trademark, its image, and its proprietary 
information. The ethics board would help manage NSW’s social capital and its network 
of official relationships with outside actors. Such a board should also be mandated to 
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doggedly pursue non-disclosure agreement violations by working closely with the NSW 
security manager, NSW Staff Judge Advocate, Defense Office of Prepublication and 
Security Review (DOPSR), Unauthorized Disclosure Group (UDG), Naval Criminal 
Investigative Service (NCIS), and the Department of Justice (DoJ). This board would 
advise the NSWC commander on issues related to the SEAL Ethos, and should monitor 
the activities of former SEALs who use the SEAL identity to turn a profit, especially 
when those activities create publicity. The board could then leverage NSW’s social 
capital and network of relationships to put pressure on those who violate the Ethos, and 
do damage to national security and NSW’s credibility.  
For example, Force12 Media’s brand partners include Oakley, Danner, Thales, 
SureFire, and Sig Sauer, just to name a few. If NSW had an ethics board, it could work 
with the NSW public affairs office to inform these entities that NSW does not sanction or 
condone the actions of Force12 Media. Why should NSW or USSOCOM then pursue 
contractual relationships with companies that support an organization whose mission is to 
divulge authentic, accurate, and timely information about special operations? Maybe 
NSW should instead purchase shooting glasses, guns, boots, and communications gear 
from someone else. The point here is that USSOCOM and NSW have significant 
leverage through their buying power, which can be put to use when seeking to thwart and 
deter those bent on profiting from NSW’s collective capital. The ethics board would 
serve as the first line of both defense and deterrence when it comes to protecting NSW’s 
credibility by actively managing the SEAL brand and guarding against its embezzlement 
by political actors, corporations, and self-serving SEALs. 
C. GRASSROOTS APPROACH 
Last, we come to the grassroots approach, which may be the most important effort 
of all—but is one that does not require official sanctioning or an additional expenditure of 
resources. Those of us who are Navy SEALs need to begin actively fighting against this 
emerging SEAL subculture of self-aggrandizement and exposure. We SEALs need to 
engage in a counterinsurgency to recover and preserve our mystique. We SEALs need to 
leverage our network of relationships to undermine publicity-seeking SEALs and their 
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efforts. We need to remind our families, our friends, and our neighbors that promoting 
SEALs in the media puts lives at risk. Every time a SEAL gets the chance, he needs to 
express his disgust with the current situation. There needs to be a dedicated information 
campaign to discredit individuals who seek to profit from exposing NSW in the public 
domain. Efforts like Don Shipley’s to expose fake SEALs (for a nominal fee) are 
commendable, but the impact of a handful of individuals who want to impress somebody 
by pretending to be a SEAL is negligible at best.118 There is far greater danger when 
actual SEALs use the credibility of NSW to confuse or misguide Americans. Ultimately, 
we SEALs are both a source of the problem and the solution in this fight for the soul of 
Naval Special Warfare. If we do not fix ourselves, who will fix us? 
                                                 




With U.S. troops still in Afghanistan, commitments to Iraq and Syria growing, 
and widespread unrest unfolding in other corners of the world, the United States will 
need to continue leveraging the unique skill sets of U.S. SOF well into the future. The 
relationship between these forces and society is undergoing an observable shift. Secrecy 
and discretion are no longer assured, as the benefits of disclosing operational details for 
personal gain may outweigh any loyalties to an organization or ethos. Eric Ouellet, in his 
edited volume, New Directions in Military Sociology, hints that work in military 
sociology may be too narrow, and that the field is due for an expansion.119 The study of 
special operations and the delicate interplay among professionalism, secrecy, 
organizational ethos, politics, and retirement, may offer just such an opportunity. Ouellet 
recalls Janowitz’s thesis that “the military institution must be examined in its process of 
change because it must necessarily change with the changing conditions of the society to 
which it belongs.”120 That change is happening now in special operations, and it may not 
necessarily be positive.  
The individuals mentioned in this thesis, and others out promoting themselves as 
SEALs, represent the minority. However, the wrong message delivered by a false prophet 
can trigger problems across the full spectrum of civil-military trust relationships. 
Accordingly, the government, Naval Special Warfare, and society must take active steps 
to reverse current trends. The commodification of Naval Special Warfare by the 
government, former SEALs, and society writ large, is undermining the contract between 
the military and the society it is meant to protect. When there exists an appetite in society 
to know the intimate details of contemporary military operations, a real danger exists for 
members of the U.S. Armed Forces. If politics are allowed to cloud the apolitical nature 
of elite military organizations like NSW, credibility and capability are diminished, and 
the fabric of civil-military relations is strained. Society must not fall victim to the current 
                                                 
119 Eric Ouellet, “New Directions in Military Sociology,” in New Directions in Military Sociology, ed. 
Eric Ouellet (Whitby, Ontario, Canada: de Sitter Publications, 2005), 4. 
120 Ouellet, New Directions in Military Sociology, 7. 
 60
“SEAL Mythos,” which, as retired SEAL Bob Schoultz correctly says “speaks more of 
bravado than quiet professionalism, more in-your-face, than humble servant of our 
country.”121 The people of this nation should be suspicious of SEALs who speak too 
loudly about themselves or act too interested in undermining their elected leaders.  
Admiral William H. McRaven’s retirement message in August 2014, after thirty-
seven years in Naval Special Warfare is instructive. “We must maintain our humility in 
the face of great public adoration and acclaim. Today, we are inundated by stories in the 
media telling us how great we are. We are great, but success and praise can be fleeting, 
and the quickest way to lose the respect of the American people is to become too 
enthralled with ourselves.”122 
                                                 
121 Bob Schoultz, “Ethos or Mythos,” Bob Schoultz’s Corner, November 5, 2010, 
http://bobscorner.wordpress.com/2010/11/05/ethos-or-mythos/. 
122 “Passing of the Torch,” Ethos 26 (2014): 7, http://www.sealswcc.com/pdf/navy-seal-ethos-
magazine/ethos-magazine-issue-26.pdf. 
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APPENDIX. NAVY SEAL ETHOS123 
In times of war or uncertainty there is a special breed of warrior ready to 
answer our Nation’s call. A common man with uncommon desire to 
succeed. Forged by adversity, he stands alongside America’s finest special 
operations forces to serve his country, the American people, and protect 
their way of life. I am that man. 
My Trident is a symbol of honor and heritage. Bestowed upon me by the 
heroes that have gone before, it embodies the trust of those I have sworn 
to protect. By wearing the Trident I accept the responsibility of my chosen 
profession and way of life. It is a privilege that I must earn every day. My 
loyalty to Country and Team is beyond reproach. I humbly serve as a 
guardian to my fellow Americans always ready to defend those who are 
unable to defend themselves. I do not advertise the nature of my work, nor 
seek recognition for my actions. I voluntarily accept the inherent hazards 
of my profession, placing the welfare and security of others before my 
own. I serve with honor on and off the battlefield. The ability to control 
my emotions and my actions, regardless of circumstance, sets me apart 
from other men. Uncompromising integrity is my standard. My character 
and honor are steadfast. My word is my bond. 
We expect to lead and be led. In the absence of orders I will take charge, 
lead my teammates and accomplish the mission. I lead by example in all 
situations. I will never quit. I persevere and thrive on adversity. My Nation 
expects me to be physically harder and mentally stronger than my 
enemies. If knocked down, I will get back up, every time. I will draw on 
every remaining ounce of strength to protect my teammates and to 
accomplish our mission. I am never out of the fight. 
We demand discipline. We expect innovation. The lives of my teammates 
and the success of our mission depend on me - my technical skill, tactical 
proficiency, and attention to detail. My training is never complete. We 
train for war and fight to win. I stand ready to bring the full spectrum of 
combat power to bear in order to achieve my mission and the goals 
established by my country. The execution of my duties will be swift and 
violent when required yet guided by the very principles that I serve to 
defend. Brave men have fought and died building the proud tradition and 
feared reputation that I am bound to uphold. In the worst of conditions, the 
legacy of my teammates steadies my resolve and silently guides my every 
deed. I will not fail.   
                                                 
123 SEAL + SWCC: Official Naval Special Warfare website, http://www.sealswcc.com/navy-seals-
ethos.html#.Vj3Ap4QkLih. 
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